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xv, [1], 191 pages. Illustrations. Notes. Figures. Tables. Appendix. Index. Ink note on front cover. Includes Disclaimer, Foreword, about the Author, and Acknowledgments. Also includes chapters on Introduction; Innovation and Military Revolutions; Logic and Procedure of Analysis; Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force; The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52; and Conclusion. There are 8 black and white illustrations of Boeing Models, and 5 tables of USAF Engine Development Time; B52 Timeline; Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii; XB-52 Performance Requirement; and Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turboprop and Basic Turbojet Models. Dr. Mark D. Mandeles founded the J. De Bloch Group, a national security policy consulting firm in 1993, and is an Professorial Lecturer at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He currently is a Senior Advisor at the Center for Naval Analyses, and has worked in or consulted for the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Director of Net Assessment, US JFCOM/Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)/Director Defense Research and Engineering, Joint Staff, USAF/Office of Long Range Planning, Marine Corps Combat Development Center/ Wargaming and Assessment Division, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Institute for Defense Analyses, Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office, and the U.S. GAO. Dr. Mandeles is the author or co-author of seven books, and articles, reports,and essays. National security decision makers face an uncertain world where the accelerated growth of knowledge has changed the character of technological advance and destabilized long-standing relations within and among the military services. Dr Mandeles separates the principles that guide decision making from the proverbs through a case study of decision making in the early post-World War II period. This study examines the impact of organization on the invention and development of jet propulsion-in the form of the B-52-and illustrates both the organizational conditions conducive to developing new operational concepts and the organizational innovations necessary to implement new technology. This study also examines how the Air Force organized to learn and acquire new technology, how the Air Force conceived or identified problems, and how it organized to ensure management would respond to program failure or errors. Attention is devoted to the origins of the weapons system operational requirement, the initial concept of operation, the evolution of technology, organizational structure, and implementation.
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