GRAND DELUSION - STALIN & THE GERMAN INVASION: STALIN AND THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

This important book draws on vital new archival material to unravel the mystery of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 and Stalin's enigmatic behavior on the eve of the attack. Challenging the currently popular view that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a preemptive strike, Gorodetsky argues that Stalin was actually negotiating for peace in order to redress the European balance of power.

Gorodetsky's diplomatic history of the period immediately preceding WWII effectively refutes the argument, made most popular by Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker, that Stalin authorized the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 because he was preparing to bring revolutionary war to Europe and wanted to neutralize Hitler. Having examined recently opened Soviet archives, Gorodetsky, a professor of history at Tel Aviv University, shows that, while Stalin feared a German attack, he thought he could work out a traditional balance-of-power arrangement with Germany that established recognized spheres of influence. The reason Stalin succumbed to this delusion, according to Gorodetsky, was that he distrusted Britain more than he feared Hitler. He loathed the idea of becoming Britain's pawn, believing (not without reason, as it turned out) that a Soviet-British alliance would make cannon fodder of the poorly prepared Red Army. Gorodetsky reveals that Stalin both courted and bullied the leaders of Bulgaria and Turkey in hopes of gaining control of the Bosphorus and then using that control as a bargaining chip when striking a balance of power in the region. As for the contention that Stalin planned to export revolution by war, Gorodetsky, like many before him, observes that Stalin's purges of the officer corps had rendered the Red Army ill-prepared for a defensive war, much less an attack on Nazi Germany. Though stiffly written in some places, this thorough analysis of Soviet diplomatic brinksmanship makes it more than clear that Stalin was ultimately driven more by a combination of paranoia and realpolitik than by Bolshevik ideology. (Sept.)
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

An intense, and densely written, study of the strategic and diplomatic reasons for the German invasion of Russia in WWII and of why Stalin wasnt better prepared to defend the country. Gorodetsky (East European History/Tel Aviv University, Israel) draws on a wealth of Soviet materials previously unavailable, as well as on material from German and British archives, to argue that this lack of preparation until just weeks before Germany launched its attack was not motivated by political navet but rather by Stalins own brand of realpolitika hope for European peace on terms dictated by Germany, terms in which Stalin would have a part, as an ally of Hitlers through the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Gorodetsky looks carefully at the various corespondences and examines the aims that blinded Stalin to the dangers that were building as Germany deployed its troops closer and closer to the Russian border. In addition, Gorodetsky also examines the effect that the Stalinist purges of the 1930s had in Russias attempts to formulate a strategic response to the German buildup of troops without provoking the Wehrmacht into further action. Gorodetskys arguments are clear once the reader has managed to unearth them from the mounds of dense, jargon-filled prose in which they are buried. There are few sentences shorter then a full paragraph, and the book is more than twice as long as it needs be. Gorodetskys concluding chapter, a concise 7 pages, sums up all the 300 pages that precede it. Alas for the reader that this chapter comes at the books end rather than at its beginning. Well argued . . . and argued and argued. -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

The latest work from Gorodetsky (history, Tel Aviv Univ.; Stafford Cripp's Mission to Moscow, 1940-42) approaches the 1940-42 period in an exhaustive detail that has never before been possible. Making extensive use of recently opened Russian archives, Gorodetsky reexamines the events surrounding Hitler's 1941 invasion of Russia. Drawing on the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and personal diaries, he gives as complete a picture as possible of this most tumultuous time, giving the reader new insights into the war's tense negotiations and key players' political motivations. This book will dispel many of the long-held myths about the start of history's most written-about war. No historical collection can afford to be without this book; highly recommended for both academic and public libraries.AMark E. Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Stalin's role and motives in the Molotov Ribbentrop nonaggression pact and the subsequent German invasion of the Soviet Union remain a subject of dispute among diplomatic historians. Gorodetsky, a professor of Russian and East European History at Tel Aviv University, has utilized newly available material from Soviet archives to reach a sensible, if noncontroversial, conclusion. He rejects the currently fashionable view that Stalin had his own plans to invade Germany, "forcing" Hitler into a preemptive strike. He also rejects the "Stalin as victim" thesis, which suggests that Stalin forged the pact with Hitler only after his desperate efforts to form a united front with Britain and France were rebuffed. Rather, Gorodetsky marshals considerable evidence to show Stalin as pragmatic, cynical, and wholly devoted to advancing the Soviet Union's national interest, with little regard for the world revolution. Of course, Stalin's deep, almost pathological suspicion of Britain and France is quite evident. Conversely, his "trust" in Hitler as a fellow rogue with whom he could negotiate was a tragic delusion. Jay Freeman