International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs; A Working Paper From The Center for International Studies, MIT E38-648

[2], x, 54, [1] pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. Institutional stamp and ink notation on title page. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Gene Skolnikoff is Professor of Political Science Emeritus. Professor Skolnikoff has focused his research and teaching interests in the field of science and public policy, especially the interaction of science and technology with international affairs. This interest has covered a wide range of international subjects, including recent studies in proliferation. He studied electrical engineering at MIT, followed by politics and economics at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and political science at MIT once again. He has served on the White House staff in the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and he played an active role as Senior Consultant to the White House Science Office under President Carter. Professor Skolnikoff served as Head of the Department from 1970-74, and was Director of the Center for International Studies from 1972 to 1987. Japanese plutonium programs have aroused considerable concern from a variety of sources abroad. These concerns have persisted notwithstanding Japanese attention to safety and careful adherence to formal international requirements. International apprehension over Japanese plutonium programs is fueled by their implications for nuclear proliferation, and by lack of appreciation of background factors that are major drivers behind the programs. This study traces the implications of international responses to the Japanese programs and suggests ways to mitigate international concerns. Our primary recommendations involve modifications of existing programs rather than simple repackaging of existing initiatives. These modifications include diversifying aspects of the fuel cycle program, emphasizing long-term R&D, avoiding premature commercialization of plutonium, opening further the policy process, enhancing confidence-building measures, providing vigorous support for non-proliferation measures, and not encouraging commercial plutonium programs in other countries.…