The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future

vi, 64, [2] pages. Endnotes. Some wear to the cover edges. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community. Paraphrased from the Foreword by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., SSI's Director: The Iraq War has been the subject of heated political debate and intense academic scrutiny. Much argument has focused on the decision to invade and the size of the force tasked with the campaign. While these factors have contributed to the challenge of counterinsurgency operations, so has the American approach to unconventional war. The author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, draws on the experience of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct of this and future campaigns. He also documents the process by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq have adapted to the challenging situation and incorporated both historic and contemporary lessons into the new counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual 3-24. The author is Professor of History at DePaul University. As an adjunct faculty member of the Center for Civil Military Relations of the Naval Post Graduate school, he has co-taught several terrorism/counterterrorism/CIMIC courses and worked with a team of specialists to help the Romanian Army rewrite its doctrine.…