Learning From Iraq; Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

In Iraq the U.S. Army has undertaken counterinsurgency, a type of activity it thought it had left behind with the end of the Cold War. In the long war against terror, counterinsurgency will remain a central element of American national security policy so it is important to assess the strategic implications of the Iraq campaign. In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz, who has been writing on counterinsurgency for several decade, draws strategic lessons about counterinsurgency from the Iraq conflict. He contends that the United States is likely to undertake it in coming decades but, based on the performance in Iraq, may not be adequately prepared depending on the grand strategy which the United States adopts. Dr. Steven Metz is Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He has been with SSI since 1993. He has been an advisor to political campaigns and elements of the intelligence community; served on national security policy task forces; testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and security issues around the world. He is the author of more than 100 publications. Dr. Metz holds a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University. When the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power in the spring of 2003, American policymakers and military leaders did not expect to become involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. But it has now become the seminal conflict of the current era,and will serve as a paradigm for future strategic decisions. Since the summer of 2003, the conflict in Iraq has taken the form of a deadly learning game between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents (both U.S. and Iraqi forces). In the final reckoning, the U.S. effort in Iraq has had a number of problems. We used flawed strategic assumptions, did not plan adequately, and had a doctrinal void. There was a mismatch between strategic ends and means applied to them. By signaling in advance that we would go so far and no further, by taking escalation off the table in the insurgency's early months, we made it easier for the insurgents to convince themselves and their supporters that their ability to weather punishment outstrips the willingness of the United States to impose it. By failing to prepare for counterinsurgency in Iraq and by failing to avoid it, the United States has increased the chances of facing it again in the near future. We did not establish security before attempting transformation, thus allowing the insurgency to reach a point of psychological "set" which was difficult to reverse fairly quickly. Linking the conflict in Iraq to the global war on terror skewed the normal logic of strategy. By approaching counterinsurgency as a type of warfighting during its first year, we reverted to a strategy of attrition which did not work. …