MacArthur's "Ultra": Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-45 (Modern War Studies)

Book by Drea, Edward J.

The acronym "ULTRA," as employed here, refers to special intelligence derived from the interception and decryption of Japanese radio traffic and its use by Gen. Douglas MacArthur in his New Guinea and Philippines campaigns. Drea's excellent study uncovers the motivation behind certain command decisions that have puzzled historians, particularly in regard to the 1944 Hollandia operation in New Guinea. He demonstrates how ULTRA enabled MacArthur to select the weakest point in the enemy's defenses and then strike with overwhelming superiority. On the other hand, Drea also shows that MacArthur's use of ULTRA became a "hit or miss proposition" after Hollandia, and comes to the surprising conclusion that the general did not rely heavily on ULTRA, usually dismissing intelligence that failed to mesh with his preconceived strategic vision. The book presents a detailed illustration of the interplay between intelligence-gathering and operational planning, and uses one of history's most successful commanders as its model. Drea is chief of the research and analysis division at the Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. Photos.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Ten years after the appearance of Ronald Lewin's The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan ( LJ 1/1/82), Drea has produced a revisionist view of American strategy and decision-making in the Pacific theater of World War II. Drea posits that MacArthur's access to ULTRA radio intercepts and decoding gave him an enormous advantage over the Japanese, an advantage he did not always employ. The "American Caesar" tended to believe radio intercepts that reinforced his preconceptions of Japanese resources and strategy at the expense of other intelligence. The decision to employ atomic weapons against Japan is presented as based upon analysis of Japanese anti-invasion defenses, and MacArthur's postwar flip-flop--his criticism of the use of atomic weapons--is seen as consistent with his pattern of intelligence use and misuse. This important study belongs in all World War II collections, but readers unfamiliar with events in the Pacific theater might be advised to keep one of the single-volume histories of the war at hand, since Drea is more interested in documenting decision-making than in producing a traditional campaign history. Previewed in "The Day of Infamy in Print," LJ 9/1/91, p. 206-7.-- Stanley Planton, Ohio Univ.
Chillicothe Lib.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.