Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries

vi, 31, [3] pages. Endnotes. Some wear to the cover edges. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community. Paraphrased from the Foreword by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., SSI's Director: This monograph examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. The author is a regular instructor with the Center for Civil Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He provides programs for foreign military and government officials in developing national counterterrorism strategies and in intelligence reform.…