In December 1944, following the withdrawal of the German occupation troops, Athens became the scence of bitter fighting between the British-sponsored government of George Papandreaou and the Greek Left. This upheaal and its suppression set the stage for the full-scale civil war of 1946-1949 and for much that has plagued that troubled nation ever since.
John O. Iatrides examines the immediate causes of the "Second Round," as this tragedy came to be called, and analyzes the Allies' reactions to it. His conclusions are new and important. The real causes are to be found in the economic, social, political, and psychological exhaustion of Greece, inherited from the past and aggravated by the war and occupation. Traditionally this crisis has been regarded as a reckless bid by the Greek Communist Party to seize power and join Moscow's clients in the Balkans. This view served as a principal theme of the Truman Doctrine and a powerful stimulus for the Cold War. It is now clear that the Soviet Union chose to remain uninvolved. Knowing this, Churchill intervened in a highhanded attempt to restore the unwanted monarchy and suppress the entire republican Left, despite American disapproval of his actions.
Originally published in 1972.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Revolt in Athens
The Greek Communist Second Round, 1944-1945
By John O. IatridesPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1972 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-05203-8Contents
ABBREVIATIONS, viii,
FOREWORD by William H. McNeill, ix,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, xiv,
INTRODUCTION, 3,
I Greek Political Realities, 9,
II In Search of National Unity, 57,
III After Liberation, 132,
IV The Struggle for Athens, 200,
V Between Rounds, 256,
VI In Retrospect, 276,
APPENDICES, 289,
BIBLIOGRAPHY, 325,
INDEX, 333,
CHAPTER 1
GREEK POLITICAL REALITIES
The "Government of National Unity" which reached liberated Athens on October 18, 1944 represented an elaborate compromise and a balance of forces whose intricacy defies simple analysis. It had brought together men without a demonstrable power base or a coherent program and with a popular appeal yet to be determined. It had been the product of the complete collapse and demoralization of the country's political parties since the mid-1930's, of sharp clashes inside and outside occupied Greece, of the menacing spectre of a powerful Left and of persistent British pressure for some semblance of unity while the war was still in progress. Even under the best of circumstances such a government could be expected to serve only as a temporary accommodation until the country's political life could be revived and its component parts had regained their confidence and individuality.
The legacy of past failures and bitter partisan divisions did not augur well for Prime Minister Papandreou's frail coalition. The war had found Greece's political forces in a state of enforced paralysis, and foreign occupation had done nothing to heal old sores. Instead, new explosive issues aggravated traditional rivalries, mixing fundamental discord with fear, mutual suspicion, and petty vituperation. The psychological damage which the first Great War had caused had never been repaired. The tug-of-war between Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine before Greece finally joined the Entente in 1917 had crystallized into a schism which profoundly affected the country's internal development and foreign relations. The forced departure of the pro-German King and Venizelos' impressive diplomatic accomplishments at the Paris Peace Conference had seriously weakened the royalist cause but had left unanswered the "constitutional question" of the throne's prerogatives regarding the expression of the national will. Although Constantine returned triumphant following the plebiscite of December 5, 1920, his image remained tarnished, particularly since the Allied powers would no longer accord him formal recognition, and withdrew their support from the Greek military campaign into Turkey. That disastrous Anatohan adventure and the consequent frantic search for scapegoats culminating in the hasty execution of six prominent figures had deepened the Venizelist-royalist cleavage and had unleashed powerful emotions destined to reverberate for decades. The dream of Megali Idea, of a Greater Greece vaguely reminiscent of Byzantine glories, had now turned into a horrible national nightmare. While Venizelos, whose Liberal Party had suffered a crushing defeat in November 1920, watched sullenly from abroad, Constantine left the country once again (in September 1922), this time never to return. His eldest son and successor, George II, fared no better: following the military coup of Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras, a rising republican tide forced the new monarch to accept exile. In May 1924 the count
