The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, No. 3, Sept. 1958. Monograph issue.

First Edition. 1 leaf, pp. 203-64. Original printed wrappers. Loose table of contents laid in. Very Good. Thomas C. Schelling: Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2005 (shared with Robert J. Aumann), 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.' 'An attempt to extend the scope of game theory, using the zero-sum game as a limiting case rather than as a point of departure. The proposed extension consists of identifying the perceptual and suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations, and of identifying some of the basic 'moves' that may occur in actual games of strategy and the structural elements on which the moves depend. Game theory is underdeveloped along these lines in that 'rational strategies' pursued by two players in a situation of pure conflict should not be expected to reveal what kind of behavior is conductive to mutual accommodation, or how mutual dependence can be exploited for unilateral gain' (Web site of the Rand Corporation, which reprinted the book). '[T]his early work was all in cooperative game theory. John Nash had introduced the basic concept of noncooperative equilibrium in 1951, but in the decade thereafter there was very little work in noncooperative game theory. The most important advance in this decade was Thomas Schelling's (1957, 1958) theory of the focal-point effect in games with multiple equilibria, which he advocated as a better way to understand bargaining in the real world' (Roger Meyerson, 'Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi', August 31, 2000; on Meyerson's Northwestern Web page). Schelling (1957) to which Meyerson refers is 'Bargaining, communication and limited war' (Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, 19-36). Also see Alessandro Innocenti, 'Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory. The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry' (Nov. 2005), in which the University of Siena professor prints an interesting e-mail sent him by Schelling: 'Harsanyi and I overlapped at Yale University for about two years in the 1950s but we had little communication. That was partly because he was shy and reticent, partly I think because his English was not comfortable for him. I believe others had the same experience. I published an article, On the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory in August, 1959, eighteen months after I had left Yale; I included it in my book, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960. It mainly targeted Harsanyi's work, but I am not aware that he paid any attention to it. We certainly did not correspond about it. I wish we had. That's about all I can tell you. I wish I had more.'.…