The content of the weekly Torah portion inspired philosophers, writers, poets, composers, and artists in an epitome of creative culture. The creation of culture is a creation of a world. When we speak of the Torah as a source of inspiration for thinkers, writers, and artists, we are in fact recapitulating the words of the Sages, who said that the Torah preceded the world and was the inspiration for all creation... Men and women who have wished to resemble God have looked into the Torah and built their own creative worlds. That is what the Rabbis of the Talmud and the Midrash, Saadiah Gaon, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, Hume, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Rembrandt and many others have done.
Philosophers, writers, painters, composers and poets, thinkers and artists have all looked into the Torah and created worlds. The idea of reversing the sequence of events, of the Torah having preceded the world, has deep dialogical roots. The Torah was given at Sinai, but Sinai, according to this approach, is not a one time historical event sublime and momentous, but nonetheless a part of the past. It is rather, a source of hope for the future.
Wisdom by the Week
The Weekly Torah Portion as an Inspiration for Thought and CreativityTHE MICHAEL SCHARF PUBLICATION TRUST OF THE YESHIVA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2011 Yeshiva University Press
All right reserved.ISBN: 978-1-60280-199-8Contents
Introduction: Culture Creates Culture Naftali Rothenberg..................................................xiParashat Bereshit Hamutal Bar-Yosef on A.B. Yehoshua.....................................................3Parashat Noah David Ohana on Nehama Leibowitz, Yitzhak Danziger..........................................11Parashat Lekh-lekha Gitit Holzman on Elia Benamozegh.....................................................23Parashat Vayera Hagai Dagan on Soren Kierkegaard.........................................................34Parashat Hayei Sarah Eliezer Schweid on Nahmanides, Maimonides, A. D. Gordon.............................40Parashat Toledot Irit Aminof on Rabbi Yohanan, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish...................................56Parashat Vayetze Yeshaya Steinberger on Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler..........................................73Parashat Vayishlah Erella Yedgar on Nehama Leibowitz.....................................................85Parashat Vayeshev Shimon Gershon Rosenberg (Shagar) on Nahman of Breslov.................................101Parashat Vayigash Eliezer Schweid on Isaac Abravanel.....................................................128Parashat Vayehi Yeshaya Steinberger on Yitzhak Hutner....................................................144Parashat Shernot Pnina Galpaz-Feller on Sigmund Freud....................................................163Parashat Va'era Bryna Levy on Samuel David Luzzatto......................................................174Parashat Bo Shlomo Tikochinski on Nahmanides.............................................................185Parashat Beshalah Yehoyada Amir on Spinoza, Mendelssohn, Buber...........................................195Parashat Yitro Yehoyada Amir on Franz Rosenzweig.........................................................205Parashat Mishpatim Yotam Benziman on Martin Buber........................................................213Parashat Terumah Hava Pinhas-Cohen on Shmuel YosefAgnon..................................................223Parashat Tetzaveh Elhanan Yakira on Barukh Spinoza.......................................................237Parashat Ki Tissa Yair Tzaban on Ber Borochov............................................................258Parashat Vayakhel Avi Katzman on Mordecai Kaplan.........................................................272Parashat Pekudei Benzi Schreiber on Avraham Krol.........................................................281Parashat Vayikra Shmuel Wygoda on Emmanuel Levinas.......................................................295Parashat Tzav Warren Zev Harvey on Gersonides............................................................307Parashat Shemini Michael Zvi Nehorai on A.I. Kook........................................................317Parashat Tazri'a Jacob J. Schacter on Joseph B. Soloveitchik.............................................324Parashat Metzora Naftali Rothenberg on the Hafetz Hayim..................................................332Parashat Aharei Mot Avigdor Shinan on an Anonymous Thinker...............................................344Parashat Kedoshim Reuven Gerber on A.I. Kook.............................................................359Parashat Emor Nahum Rakover on A.I. Kook.................................................................375Parashat Behar Benjamin Brown on the Hazon Ish...........................................................394Parashat Behukotai Tsvia Walden on Abraham Joshua Heschel................................................404Parashat Bamidbar Gili Zivan on Rosenzweig, Fromm, Leibowitz.............................................415Parashat Naso Shalom Ratzaby on A. D. Gordon.............................................................427Parashat Beha'alotekha Hanoch Ben Pazi on Yitzhak Hutner.................................................445Parashat Shelah-lekha Yoske Achituv on Hayim of Volozhin.................................................457Parashat Korah Avinoam Rosenak on A. I. Kook, Yeshayahu Leibowitz........................................476Parashat Balak Yossi Turner on Nahman Krochmal...........................................................493Parashat Pinhas Yedidyah Yitzhaki on Spinoza, Locke, A.I. Kook...........................................506Parashat Matot Reuven Gerber on A. D. Gordon.............................................................519Parashat Mas 'ei Michael Zvi Nehorai on I.J. Reines......................................................531Parashat Devarim Hagai Dagan on Hans Jonas...............................................................541Parashat Va'ethanan Marla L. Frankel on Samson Raphael Hirsch............................................548Parashat Ekev Alvin I. Schiff on Ovadiah Sforno..........................................................571Parashat Re'eh Einat Ramon on Judith Plaskow.............................................................577Parashat Shofiim Hannah Kasher on Joseph Ibn Kaspi.......................................................585Parashat Ki Teze Rachel Elior on Dalia Rabikovitz........................................................596Parashat Ki Taro Christoph Schmidt on Hermann Cohen......................................................613Parashat Nitzavim Chaniel Farber on the Hafetz Hayim.....................................................626Parashat Vayelekh Lea Mazor on Shulamith Hareven.........................................................638Parashat Ha'azinu Moshe Sokolow on Solomon Ephraim Luntschitz............................................653Parashat Vezot Naftali Rothenberg on Haberakhah the Meshekh Hokhmah......................................662Biographies...............................................................................................671List of Authors...........................................................................................691
Chapter One
Hamutal Bar-Yosef
Bereshit – In the Beginning
Abraham B. Yehoshua on the Story of Cain and Abel
If thou doest well, thou shalt prevail; and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door; and unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it (Genesis 4:7).
A.B. Yehoshua is best known in Israel as one of the most important authors of his generation—the generation of the birth of the Jewish state (dor ha-medinah). His approach to Israeli reality is rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis. During the 1960s and 70s, Yehoshua saw an Israeli experience characterized by complexes, a subconscious, pathological repression, and a need for psychotherapy in order to recover its sanity. This approach is clearly reflected in his collection of essays Between Right and Right (Bizkhut ha-normaliyut) (1980), in which he attempts to define Zionist goals in psychoanalytical terms, that is sane Israeli existence, free from Diaspora complexes and all types of spiritual and behavioral extremism. The views that Yehoshua expresses in this series of essays and in another collection entitled The Wall and the Mountain (Ha-kir ve-ha-har) represent the standpoint of secular Israeli Zionism, which aspires above all to afford Israelis the possibility of living quiet and productive lives in their own land, free of the anxiety and pressures engendered by "the situation."
In his book The Terrible Power of a Minor Guilt (Kohah ha-nora shel ashmah ketanah) (1988)—the product of a series of university lectures—Yehoshua begins his introduction with a complaint about the state of literary criticism, which he believes has failed to relate to the ethical aspect of literature:
It is only on rare occasions that we hear a reader voice words of protest or admiration for the ethical stance of a story or author of a literary work of any kind.... The catchwords of literary criticism, both professional and personal, are: "plausibility," "complexity, "depth," and especially "originality." It is only on rare occasions indeed that words such as "ethics," "values," "truth," and "goodness," come up (p. 11).
Furthermore, he claims, "of late, literature itself has begun to obfuscate the natural ethical conflicts that appear within the fabric of the text; relegating them to the backstage" (p. 16). Yehoshua asks why this happens and offers a number of possible explanations. First and foremost, he asserts, the cause "lies in the growth and heightening of psychological knowledge, allowing us to better understand the sources of human failure and deviant behavior, significantly reducing our willingness to pass ethical judgment" (ibid.).
Psychological understanding pulls the rug out from under ethical judgment, claims Yehoshua. The more sophisticated our psychological insight, the harder it is for us to identify with ethical judgment: psychology has accustomed us to think that there is no such thing as a bad person, only a disturbed, affection-starved, paranoid, frustrated person suffering from some complex or other, inflicted by parents or society. It has also accustomed us to the notion that there is no such thing as a good person: good in its accepted meaning being merely a reaction formation to repressed and deviant desires that, despite their righteous exterior, could be harmful to the person's environment. Dostoevsky, claims Yehoshua, could never have written Crime and Punishment today without addressing Raskolnikov's childhood and his relationship with his mother and his sister (although Freud himself was deeply influenced by Dostoevsky). Moreover, the habit of psychological thinking also affects our reading of texts centered on ethical dilemmas. Sophocles' plays—Antigone for example—have been the subject of a number of psychoanalytical interpretations that have focused on the heroine's complexes and inhibitions, asserting that Antigone was driven to suicide by her frustrated sexual desires. A similar approach is taken by Dan Miron in his books Taking Leave of the Impoverished Self (Ha-pridah rain ha-ani he'ani) (1986) and A Butterfly from the Worm (Parpar min ha-tola 'at) (2001)—on the young Bialik and the young Alterman, respectively. Miron also adopts a psychological approach to the texts he treats, although they can easily be read from an ethical standpoint as well.
Surprisingly, Yehoshua's own early works, such as the stories The Yatir Evening Express and Three Days and a Child, could be cited to illustrate his point. These works also seem to relegate the ethical dilemma to the sidelines, emphasizing the Freudian psychological mechanism that governs the protagonists' behavior and justifies it. The characters in The Yatir Evening Express derail a train with the sole purpose of alleviating the bleakness of the village of Yatir. In Three Days and a Child, the protagonist nearly kills a small child in order to free himself from his obsession with the child's mother—his former lover. Yehoshua's words in his introduction to The Terrible Power of a Minor Guilt would thus seem to represent a significant change of worldview, an attempt to free himself from the psychoanalytical approach in which he had been trapped for many years.
Let us now look at Yehoshua's interpretation of the story of Cain and Abel. This story, like all of the stories addressed in The Terrible Power of a Minor Guilt, is treated as a literary work within which the author has placed an ethical message. God's behavior in the story of Cain and Abel, claims Yehoshua at the beginning of the chapter, is perplexing. The reader's basic sense of justice would expect murder to be punished with death, and God—the epitome of justice—to impose just such a sentence upon Cain. After all, a reader in ancient times might have claimed, God himself said to Noah and his sons, after the flood: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (9:6). How can Cain's punishment be reconciled with the ethos of "an eye for an eye" (Ex. 21:24), he would have wondered? The question is equally relevant, however, to the modern Israeli reader who, at least according to Yehoshua, shares the same basic sense of justice that gave rise to the principle of "an eye for an eye."
Yehoshua thus suggests the following interpretation: God, as an omniscient being, was fully aware of Cain's inner weaknesses—including his homicidal tendencies—before they were ever manifested. The punishment that he imposed was thus essentially internal as well. "A fugitive and a wanderer," according to Yehoshua, refers to a lack of mental stability, living in a permanent state of neurosis. This punishment continues to plague Cain long after his external life has been rehabilitated.
The first thing we are struck by is the fact that Yehoshua, despite all of his criticism of psychoanalysis and its influence on contemporary culture, seems to have been unable to escape it himself. His interpretation of the Cain and Abel story also betrays the influence of European literature, deeply influenced in turn, by Christian thought. Contrary to the commonly held belief regarding the importance of action in Jewish ethics, Yehoshua credits the author of the story with an ethical code that judges a man's morality on the basis of his individual psychological makeup. Cain's punishment, according to Yehoshua, thus resembles Raskolnikov's inner torment, making the story more accessible to the modern reader, in a culture that places great value upon man's individuality, judging him by his mental and emotional characteristics—factors taken into consideration even by the courts.
Personally, I find the story of Cain and Abel perplexing from the very beginning, even before the punishment stage. Verse 5 reads: "But unto Cain and to his offering He [God] had not respect." What is the meaning of this unexplained preference? Does God not understand the feelings of one who brings his beloved possessions, the fruits of his labor, in order to express love and devotion, only to be rebuffed by the recipient? Could God not have understood and known the anguish Cain would feel at the sight of his brother's gift being preferred over his, without any apparent reason, as well as the consequences of such feelings? Are knowledge and wisdom not the traits we most expect of God (as manifest in the Garden of Eden story, for example)? Is such behavior just? Can it serve as a model for human behavior? In my opinion, such behavior—on a human level—is insensitive, unwise, and—on a divine level—can be understood as even intentionally cruel.
I believe that God wished to test Cain, like his parents before him, by offering him an ethical choice. The alternatives are made absolutely clear to Cain: "For if thou doest well, thou shalt prevail/bear [the Hebrew word se 'et is ambivalent and grammatically strange]; and if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door." The verse is puzzling. A choice is clearly being offered between two courses of action, one good and the other bad, but what exactly are the choices? And why does God speak to Cain in such an enigmatic fashion when he is already confused and in a state of emotional turmoil? The linguistic difficulties presented by the verse would seem an accurate reflection of Cain's state of mind: agitated, confused, unsure of the right path, of the precise meaning of the divine voice. The most difficult word in the verse is se 'et (literally: "bear," translated above as "thou shalt prevail" -tr.). The traditional biblical commentators suggest various interpretations, most of which assume se 'et to be the predicate of a sentence in which the subject is God. According to Onkelos, Rashi, Radak (David Kimhi), and the Da 'at zekenim miba 'alei hatosafot, it is God who will bear Cain's sin, that is will grant him forgiveness if he mends his ways. Ibn Ezra explains that God will restore Cain's dignity and will let him prevail; while Nahmanides suggests that God will prefer Cain over his brother; and Seforno—that he will make Cain great. In the opinion of Rabbi Bahye ben Asher of Saragossa, se 'et signifies "bringing a gift'—God is thus asking Cain to bring him a better offering, worthy of being accepted. Only the much later interpretation of Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveichik stresses Cain's role—"Do not despair, for you still have the power to improve your situation." It is unclear, however, how the word se 'et lends itself to such an explanation. The basis for all of these explanations would appear to be the appearance of a word deriving from the same Hebrew root (nasa') in verse 13, understood in the sense of "forgiveness"—"my sin is too great [for God] to forgive (mineso)".
Avraham Even-Shoshan, in his dictionary of the Hebrew language, cites this verse as an example of the verb's use in the sense of forbearance, as in "Surely our diseases he did bear" (Is. 53:4) and "I am weary to bear them" (op. cit. 1:14). In other words, verse 7 may be referring to the possibility that it was Cain's duty to forbear his anger, aroused by the unequal treatment afforded to the two brothers—treatment which he perceived as intolerable favoritism.
Initially, some may find the interpretation I am about to propose difficult to accept. Was God suggesting that Cain do nothing about Abel? Many have remarked on the enigmatic phrasing in verse 8: "And Cain spoke unto Abel his brother and it came to pass when they were in the field that Cain rose up against Abel his brother and slew him." What did Cain say to Abel? To my mind, this is the crux of the matter, because in fact, he said nothing. Anger stifled his ability to speak to Abel. This silence is a crucial part of Cain's "possession" by the beast of sin; the process whereby he loses his divine image. Cain, like his parents before him, fails the ethical test that God sets before him, and his failure is greater than theirs, because its price is the life of his brother. Now, he must be punished—perhaps even more severely than his parents. Why then does God shield him and allow him to rebuild his life?
The answer can be found later in the chapter, in the story of Lemech. This story appeals to the basic human urge to exact revenge from someone who has caused you harm, giving him his comeuppance—-or more—in order to assuage the rage and the pain. And indeed, that is what Lemech, a descendant of Cain's, does in verses 23-24. "I have slain a man for wounding me, and a young man for bruising me. If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold, truly Lemech seventy and sevenfold," he informs his two wives, apparently with pride. What is the biblical author's opinion of Lemech, and why did he append his story to that of Cain and Abel? With typical biblical economy, Lemech's terrible song weaves the thread that leads from violence to murder and yet more murder. Long before Shakespeare's Macbeth and Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, the author of this text draws a direct line from Cain, who murdered because he could not overcome his jealousy, to Lemech, who murdered merely for having been wounded or bruised. Revenge is a human impulse, esteemed in many cultures (not limited to the Orient or the ancient) as supremely ethical and manly; e.g., the dueling tradition in European culture, or Nietzsche's attitude—adopted by Micha Josef Berdyczewski—to the masculine lust for revenge.
Revenge could have been considered a positive value by the biblical author and his contemporaries as well—a fact evidenced by the Bible itself: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (9:6). Yet in the story before us, the author denounces impulsive revenge and spurns revenge as a value. He offers Cain a choice between natural impulsivity on the one hand and self-control and the ability to engage in dialogue—as should an intelligent human being created in God's image—-on the other. Like Adam and Eve, Cain too fails, and his failure reveals the tenuousness of God's image in man.
The light punishment that Cain receives is emblematic of the type of divine response that was beyond Cain. It demonstrates the difference between human impulsivity and divine wisdom. Cain is punished, not with death or vengeful murder, but in a manner that allows him to rebuild his life. God does not engage in impulsive revenge, nor does a human being capable of distinguishing between good and evil. This is how Joseph behaves when he reveals himself to his brothers. Nothing would have been more natural than to take revenge at such a time. He treats his brothers coldly, speaks harshly to them, accuses them of being spies, and locks them up for three days. The meeting is very painful to him—"And he turned himself about from them, and wept" (42:24)—but he exercises great restraint. When he saw Benjamin, "he sought where to weep ... and came out; and he refrained himself" (43:30–31). Absalom behaves in the opposite manner when he murders Amnon for the wrong he had done to their sister, and sets fire to a field in order to secure a meeting with his father (2 Sam. 13–14). Absalom's selfishness and vengeful impulsivity will exact a heavy price later in the story. When we read such stories, we get the impression that the author (assuming a single author) places great ethical value upon wisdom, moderation and self-control, and decries vengefulness and impulsivity. Leviticus 19:18 commands: "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge." And although it is also written "The Lord is a jealous and avenging God" (Nahum 1:2), the latter belongs to the apocalyptic world of the Later Prophets—quite different from that of the author of Genesis in whose eyes, knowledge is the mark of the divine image in man, not jealousy and revenge.
(Continues...)
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