The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World - Hardcover

Moisi, Dominique

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9780385523769: The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0385523769 ISBN 13: 9780385523769

Publisher: Doubleday, 2009

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The first book to expose and investigate the far-reaching emotional impact of globalization.

In his celebrated 1993 book The Clash of Civilizations, political scientist Samuel Huntington argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the post–Cold War world would not be primarily ideological or economic, but cultural. In The Geopolitics of Emotion Dominique Mo�si, a leading authority on international affairs, demonstrates that our post-9/11 world has become divided by more than cultural fault lines between nations and civilizations. Mo�si brilliantly chronicles how the geopolitics of today is characterized by a “clash of emotions,” and how cultures of fear, humiliation, and hope are reshaping the world.

Mo�si contends that both the United States and Europe have been dominated by fears of the “other” and of their loss of a national identity and purpose. Instead of being united by their fears, the twin pillars of the West are more often divided by them—or, rather, by bitter debates over how best to confront or transcend them. For Muslims and Arabs, the combination of historical grievances, exclusion from the economic boon of globalization, and civil and religious conflicts extending from their homelands to the Muslim diaspora have created a culture of humiliation that is quickly devolving into a culture of hatred. Meanwhile, Asia has been able to concentrate on building a better future and seizing the economic initiative from the American-dominated West and so creating a new culture of hope.

Do these emotions represent underlying cultural tendencies characteristic of particular regions and populations today? How will these varying emotions influence the political, social, and cultural conflicts that roil our world? How can the West transcend its fear and avoid sliding into protectionism or militarism? What can the Muslim world do to overcome is legacy of humiliation? Will China and India manage to maintain their status as the cultures of hope? And what will the effect of the world economic crisis be? By delineating the necessity of confronting emotions to understand our changing world and deciphering the driving emotions behind our cultural differences, The Geopolitics of Emotion presents a provocative new perspective on globalization.

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About the Author:

DOMINIQUE MO�SI is a founder and now a senior adviser to the French Institute of International Affairs, (IFRI) in Paris. He writes a column for the Financial Times and contributes to Foreign Affairs. In the spring of 2009 Mo�si will be a visiting professor at the Department of Government, and Pierre Keller Visiting Professor at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, at Harvard University.

Chapter One
Globalization, Identity, and Emotions
In an age of globalization, emotions have become indispensable to grasp the complexity of the world we live in. Magnified by media, they both reflect and react to globalization and in turn influence geopolitics. Globalization may have made the world "flat," to cite journalist Thomas Friedman's famous metaphor, but it has also made the world more passionate than ever.
In a moment, we shall examine the reasons that this is true. But first we need to clarify the nature of globalization itself, since many people misunderstand it. In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman defines globalization as the international system that replaced that of the Cold War. Unlike the Cold War system, globalization is not static but a dynamic ongoing process, involving the inexorable integration of markets, nation--states, and technologies to a degree never before witnessed, in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and countries to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. This same process is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by the new system.
For many people, especially critics, globalization is identical with Americanization. The spread of American influence--political, economic, and cultural--dates back at least to the Second World War, but it gained new strength after the end of the Soviet empire in 1991, which left the United States as the world's only superpower. Thus the growing unification of the world's economies and cultures means in effect a unification on American terms. As a result, today's antiglobalization protests, which are now mounting with the deepening of the current financial and economic crisis, combine anti--American sentiments with anticapitalist critiques in their struggle for equality, fair trade, and sustainable development.
But when we look closer, we see that the equation of globalization with Americanization is too simplistic. The reality is that while the cultural influence of the United States throughout the world is all--pervasive and unprecedented, economically the West is being overtaken by Asia. The current phase of globalization reflects the coming-of-age of the Asian continent, resulting in the relay of economic power from an American--dominated West to China and India.
Globalization can thus be seen as the combination of two disparate phenomena, which may be seen as either contradictory or complementary. On the one hand, we witness the impact of the cultural Americanization of the world. The French economist Daniel Cohen believes that the gradual reduction of birthrates in the Southern Hemisphere is the direct result of the popularity of American television series, families with two children having become a universal ideal. On the other hand, the economic rise of Asia is bringing about the end of the monopoly of the Western model. Western predominance in the world, which began with the establishment of the Raj in India in the mid--eighteenth century and the decline of China in the early nineteenth and culminated in the early part of the twentieth century, seems to be coming to an end. This comes as no surprise to historians of empire, who have long known that the rise and fall of empires follow a cyclical pattern.
This leads to a situation of asymmetric multipolarity: The key actors on the world stage not only are unequal in terms of power and influence but also differ dramatically in their views of the world. While America and Europe still approach world affairs in a normative manner on the basis of a belief in universal values, China and India and now also post--Communist Russia appear far less interested in what the world should become than in their own positions of power within it. (Thus, for example, Russia's oil and gas wealth is not supposed to contribute to the improvement of life on the planet but to restore the strength and legitimacy of Russia in the international system.)
Such a pragmatic approach is evident in China's view of Singapore. That city--state, with its fusion of Confucian values and eighteenth-century-style enlightened despotism, has played a major role in the evolution of modern China. When, in February 1978, China's new leader, Deng Xiaoping, stopped in Singapore on a diplomatic visit, he did not recognize the "mosquito dump" he remembered from the 1920s. Barely a decade after achieving its independence in 1965, Singapore was already a prosperous city that had embraced capitalism under the firm but enlightened guidance of Lee Kuan Yew. Once liberated from a narrow socialist economic vision, Lee Kuan Yew argued to Deng Xiaoping, the Communist heirs of the mandarins of the Middle Empire should be able to do even better economically than the descendants of poor Chinese peasants from the south. And indeed this has been the broader vision that Deng and the rest of China's leaders have followed.
For China, this pragmatic approach has paid off. The country's remarkable economic progress has been achieved without democracy, even without the rule of law.
In the rest of the world, meanwhile, democracy has been dangerously devalued through the inflationary use of the word by the Bush administration in its attempt to justify the United States' geopolitical ambitions. The contrast between the democratic ideal and the reality of democratic practices in too many Western and non--Western countries may explain in part the relay of power from America to Asia that I have described.
If democracies are losing faith in democratic models, and if autocratic regimes are supported in their antidemocratic practices by their combination of high economic growth and political stability, it is the Western world that suffers most from this evolution. Less than twenty years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West enjoyed a sense of supremacy because of its democratic values that more than compensated for the fact that countries like the newly united Germany were not doing well economically. But today the democratic essence of the West is no longer seen as compensating for its lack of economic performance. Maybe emotions have returned to the forefront of the international scene in part because the West can no longer rely on either its values or its fading economic supremacy and therefore reacts to global changes with a certain bitterness and a desire to protect its precious open world against hostile forces.
But the primary reason that today's globalizing world is the ideal fertile ground for the blossoming or even the explosion of emotions is that globalization causes insecurity and raises the question of identity. In the Cold War period there was never any reason to ask, "Who are we?" The answer was plainly visible on every map that depicted the two adversarial systems dividing the globe between them. But in an ever--changing world without borders, the question is intensely relevant. Identity is strongly linked with confidence, and in turn confidence, or the lack thereof, is expressed in emotions--in particular, those of fear, hope, and humiliation.
Economically, globalization can be defined simply as the integration of economic activities across borders through markets. The driving forces of globalization, masterfully analyzed by Martin Wolf, are technological and policy changes that reduce the costs of transport and communications and encourage greater reliance on market forces. But this free flow of goods in economic terms also implies in political terms the free flow of emotions, including both positive emotions (ambition, curiosity, yearning for self--expression) and evil ones, including the angry passions that lead to hatred between nations, religions, and ethnic groups. Thus terrorism has become the dark, tragic face of globalization.
I don't mean to imply that contemporary terrorism is a direct result of globalization. Terrorists have always crossed borders in pursuit of their goals (notably in nineteenth--century Europe), and the terrorism of al Qaeda has its origins in the specific political situation of the Middle East, which predates and is quite distinct from globalization. But what is new is the impact of the communications and transportation revolutions on the strategy and tactics of the terrorists, with the media revolution (including the Internet) providing new and powerful sounding boards for the terrorist message. New technologies have created a world where, to adapt the words of Churchill, "Never have so few been able to do so much harm to so many."
In a world where the West no longer has a monopoly on the media, events and conflicts can be reported from a variety of angles. The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in the summer of 2006, for instance, appeared as two entirely different wars depending on whether one viewed the coverage on Al Jazeera or on CBS news. In today's world, everyone has access not only to continuing information but also to unfolding emotions. Now that American television series reach all corners of the world and have nearly become universal frames of reference, the poor know how the rich live, and vice versa. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult for the rich to ignore the world's poor, whose anger they witness on the evening news. Many poor people risk their lives by crossing seas and climbing barriers to enter the world of the rich; others who stay at home develop an abiding hatred for the affluent who deliberately ignore their fate.
After 9/11, the brother of one of the al Qaeda terrorists, imprisoned by the American authorities before he could join the nineteen other conspirators, was interviewed on French television. He described his brother as a young man who "wanted to succeed at the top of Wall Street or destroy to ashes the world that would not make a place for him." Such a statement would be impossible if Wall Street and the Islamic Middle East still occupied separate worlds, as they once did.
In a transparent world the poor are no longer ignorant of the world of the rich, and the rich have l...

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