The rejection of consequentialism: A philosophical investigation of the considerations underlying rival moral conceptions

Scheffler, Samuel

ISBN 10: 0198246579 / ISBN 13: 9780198246572

Published by Oxford University at the Clarendon Press, 1982

About this Item

Ink name on front endpaper, else interior clean and secure. Hardcover with dustjacket. Cover clean with minor shelfwear. Interior clean, binding tight. Jacket gently rubbed. Your purchase benefits literacy and summer reading programs in Cincinnati and Hamilton County, Ohio. We ship every business day. All books ship in cardboard bookfolds with delivery confirmation. Sets or unusually heavy items ship in a box.

Seller Inventory # 056115

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The rejection of consequentialism: A philosophical investigation of the considerations underlying rival moral conceptions
• Publisher: Oxford University at the Clarendon Press
• Publication Date: 1982
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0198246579
• ISBN 13: 9780198246572
• Binding: hardcover
• Condition: Good
• Dust Jacket Condition: Good
• Weight: 13 ounces

About this title

Synopsis

In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Samuel Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.