The Multiple Realization Book

Polger, Thomas W. & Lawrence A. Shapiro

ISBN 10: 0198732899 / ISBN 13: 9780198732891

Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016

About this Item

Highly-technical monograph disputing Putnam's hypothesis of multiple realization and its advocates; the authors instead prefer the identity theory: "they see little prospect - or need - for multiple realization in an empirically-based theory of mind." Casually INSCRIBED by Shapiro to a colleague. Hardcover in jacket as pictured. Barest hint of wear, seems unread. Size: Octavo.

Seller Inventory # w0818

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Multiple Realization Book
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, Oxford
• Publication Date: 2016
• ISBN 10: 0198732899
• ISBN 13: 9780198732891
• Binding: Hard Cover
• Edition: First Edition.
• Condition: Fine
• Dust Jacket Condition: Fine
• Signed: Inscribed by the Author
• Seller catalogs:
  • Psychology
  • Signed Books
  • Philosophy

About this title

Synopsis

Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes could be identified with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science broadly. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization. Their analysis of multiple realization serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on the generality of multiple realization in the cognitive sciences. In the course of making their case, they respond to classic defenses of multiple realization that Jerry Fodor, Ned Block, and other prominent philosophers of psychology have offered. Polger and Shapiro conclude that the identity theory, once left for dead, remains a viable theory of mind--one that, when suitably framed, enjoys the benefits typically thought to accrue only to theories of mind that presuppose the truth of multiple realization. As Polger and Shapiro see matters, mind-brain identities have played an important role in the growth and achievements of the cognitive sciences, and they see little prospect--or need--for multiple realization in an empirically-based theory of mind. This leads Polger and Shapiro to offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, as well as in chemistry, biology, and other non-basic sciences.

About the Author

Thomas W. Polger, University of Cincinnati, Lawrence A. Shapiro, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Thomas W. Polger received his PhD in philosophy from Duke University in 2000, and joined the faculty of the University of Cincinnati in the same year. His previous book, Natural Minds, was a defense of the mind-brain identity theory. He is the author of numerous articles in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Polger is also a past-president of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Lawrence Shapiro received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and has been on the faculty at the University of Wisconsin since 1993. He has published numerous articles and several books on a range of topics within philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of cognitive science.