The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
US$ 9.26 shipping from Germany to U.S.A.
Destination, rates & speedsSeller: books4less (Versandantiquariat Petra Gros GmbH & Co. KG), Welling, Germany
Broschiert. Condition: Gut. 169 Seiten; Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 325. Seller Inventory # 2176640
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 19921729-n
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis. The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each particiA pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of subA jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysi Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9783540092490
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # ABLIING23Mar3113020158446
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 19921729
Quantity: 15 available
Seller: California Books, Miami, FL, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # I-9783540092490
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: NEPO UG, Rüsselsheim am Main, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Gut. 170 Seiten ex Library Book aus einer wissenschafltichen Bibliothek Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 3209. Seller Inventory # 301991
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: Antiquariat Silvanus - Inhaber Johannes Schaefer, Ahrbrück, Germany
170 pp., Aus der Präsenzbibliothek eines Institutes, daher außergewöhnlich gut erhalten! (From the reference library of an institute, therefore exceptionally well preserved!) 3540092498 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 320 Groß 8°, Original-Karton (Softcover), Bibliotheks-Exemplar (ordungsgemäß entwidmet) mit kleinem Rückenschild, Stempel auf Titel, insgesamt gutes und innen sauberes Exemplar, (library copy in good condition), Seller Inventory # 120144
Quantity: 1 available
Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from 'rational' players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis. 184 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783540092490
Quantity: 2 available
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: Brand New. reprint edition. 184 pages. 9.61x6.69x0.42 inches. In Stock. Seller Inventory # x-3540092498
Quantity: 2 available