Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories - Hardcover

Dilworth, Craig

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 9027713111 ISBN 13: 9789027713117

Publisher: Springer, 1981

Synopsis

For the philosopher interested in the idea of objective knowledge of the real world, the nature of science is of special importance, for science, and more particularly physics, is today considered to be paradigmatic in its affording of such knowledge. And no understand­ ing of science is complete until it includes an appreciation of the nature of the relation between successive scientific theories-that is, until it includes a conception of scientific progress. Now it might be suggested by some that there are a variety of ways in which science progresses, or that there are a number of different notions of scientific progress, not all of which concern the relation between successive scientific theories. For example, it may be thought that science progresses through the application of scientific method to areas where it has not previously been applied, or, through the development of individual theories. However, it is here suggested that the application of the methods of science to new areas does not concern forward progress so much as lateral expansion, and that the provision of a conception of how individual theories develop would lack the generality expected of an account concerning the progress of science itself.

About this title

From the Back Cover

Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution.

In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth’s Perspectivist conception of science does both.

While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations.

"[Dilworth] convincingly works out how from his point of view it is possible to explain the conflict between two theories as an incompatibility of perspectives, and at the same time avoid sliding into relativism by giving criteria for scientific progress." Dialectica

About the Author

Craig Dilworth, born and raised in Canada, received his PhD in Sweden in 1981. He is presently Reader in Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University. While he is fundamentally a philosopher, Dilworth is at the same time a true generalist. He has been engaged in a wide variety of environmental projects on the local level, while at the same time developing his intellectual interests in the philosophy of science, human ecology, theoretical physics, theoretical biology, and the social sciences. He is the author of two major works in the philosophy of science, Scientific Progress and The Metaphysics of Science, and an earlier book in environmental science, Sustainable Development and Decision Making. He has spent the past 15 years researching the present book.

Edition details

• Publisher: Springer
• Publication date: 1981
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 9027713111
• ISBN 13: 9789027713117
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition number: 1
• Number of pages: 164