Chilcot Report: Executive Summary

'A further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

— GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

— PHILIPPE SANDS, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS

Description

All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

• Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain

• the legal advice for the invasion

• intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and

• planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11

The impact of 9/11

Decision to take the UN route

Negotiation of resolution 1441

The prospect of military action

The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens

The end of the UN route

Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq

The UK’s relationship with the US

Decision-making. Collective responsibility

Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441

Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003

Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”

The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003

Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

The search for WMD

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks

The planning process and decision-making

Occupation. Looting in Basra

Looting in Baghdad

UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483

UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority

A decline in security

The turning point

Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA

Planning for withdrawal

The impact of Afghanistan

Iraqiisation

Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy

A possible civil war

Force Level Review

The beginning of the end

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

• Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002

Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford

Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002

• Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

WMD search

• Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003

Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

Military equipment (pre-conflict)

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

Invasion

• Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period

Reconstruction

De-Ba’athification

Security Sector Reform

Resources

Military equipment (post-conflict)

Civilian personnel

Service Personnel

Civilian casualties

Lessons. The decision to go to war

Weapons of mass destruction

The invasion of Iraq

The post-conflict period

Reconstruction

De-Ba’athification

Security Sector Reform

Resources

Military equipment (post-conflict)

Civilian personnel

Timeline of events

Sir John Chilcot, GCB PC (born 22 April 1939) is a British Privy Counsellor and former civil servant. His appointment as chairman of the Iraq Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath was announced in June 2009.He was educated at Brighton College and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he read English and languages. A career civil servant until his retirement in 1997, he served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office in charge of the Police Department, and a variety of posts in the Home Office, the Civil Service Department and the Cabinet Office, including Private Secretary appointments to Home Secretaries Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees, and William Whitelaw, and to the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong.He is now president of Britain's independent policing think tank, The Police Foundation.His honours include CB (1990), KCB (1994), and GCB (1998). He became a Privy Counsellor in 2004, and was a member of the Butler Review of the use of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He acted as "staff counsellor" to MI5 and MI6 from 1999 to 2004, "dealing with private and personal complaints from members of the intelligence services about their work and conditions".(Sir John Chilcot's Wikipedia)