Synopsis
'A further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.
— GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'
— PHILIPPE SANDS, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS
Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.
Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:
• Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
• the legal advice for the invasion
• intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and
• planning for a post-conflict Iraq.
The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Pre-conflict strategy and planning
The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11
The impact of 9/11
Decision to take the UN route
Negotiation of resolution 1441
The prospect of military action
The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens
The end of the UN route
Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?
The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq
The UK’s relationship with the US
Decision-making. Collective responsibility
Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441
Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003
Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”
The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003
Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003
Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
The search for WMD
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks
The planning process and decision-making
Occupation. Looting in Basra
Looting in Baghdad
UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483
UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority
A decline in security
The turning point
Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA
Planning for withdrawal
The impact of Afghanistan
Iraqiisation
Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy
A possible civil war
Force Level Review
The beginning of the end
Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?
• Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford
Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002
• Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
WMD search
• Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003
Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq
Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq
Invasion
• Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period
Reconstruction
De-Ba’athification
Security Sector Reform
Resources
Military equipment (post-conflict)
Civilian personnel
Service Personnel
Civilian casualties
Lessons. The decision to go to war
Weapons of mass destruction
The invasion of Iraq
The post-conflict period
Reconstruction
De-Ba’athification
Security Sector Reform
Resources
Military equipment (post-conflict)
Civilian personnel
Timeline of events
About the Author
Sir John Chilcot, GCB PC (born 22 April 1939) is a British Privy Counsellor and former civil servant. His appointment as chairman of the Iraq Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath was announced in June 2009.He was educated at Brighton College and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he read English and languages. A career civil servant until his retirement in 1997, he served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office in charge of the Police Department, and a variety of posts in the Home Office, the Civil Service Department and the Cabinet Office, including Private Secretary appointments to Home Secretaries Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees, and William Whitelaw, and to the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong.He is now president of Britain's independent policing think tank, The Police Foundation.His honours include CB (1990), KCB (1994), and GCB (1998). He became a Privy Counsellor in 2004, and was a member of the Butler Review of the use of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He acted as "staff counsellor" to MI5 and MI6 from 1999 to 2004, "dealing with private and personal complaints from members of the intelligence services about their work and conditions".(Sir John Chilcot's Wikipedia)
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
