Consciousness, function, and representation. Collected papers Volume 1.

Block, Ned:

ISBN 10: 0262026031 / ISBN 13: 9780262026031

Published by Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007

About this Item

VI, 636 S. Einband leicht berieben. Mit Mängelstempel auf Fußschnitt erworben. - Functionalism -- What is functionalism? -- What psychological states are not, with J. Fodor -- Troubles with functionalism -- What intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Sho -- Consciousness -- Review of Daniel Dennett, consciousness explained -- What is Dennett's theory a theory of? -- On a confusion about a function of consciousness -- How many concepts of consciousness? -- Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness -- Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness -- Concepts of consciousness -- How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness -- Paradox and cross-purposes in recent work on consciousness -- Spatial perception via tactile sensation -- Two neural correlates of consciousness -- Review of Alva Noe¿, action in perception -- Are absent qualia impossible? -- The harder problem of consciousness -- Max Black's objection to mind-body identity -- Qualia -- Inverted earth -- Mental paint -- Sexism, racism, ageism, and the nature of consciousness -- Is experiencing just representing? -- Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism, ISBN 9780262026031 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Seller Inventory # 1058164

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Consciousness, function, and representation. Collected papers Volume 1.
• Publisher: Cambridge: MIT Press
• Publication Date: 2007
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0262026031
• ISBN 13: 9780262026031
• Binding: Originalleinen.
• Condition: Gut
• Weight: 550 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • Psychologie

About this title

Synopsis

This volume of Ned Block's writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem—a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. One paper on this topic considers the upshot for the mind-body problem of the possibility of a robot that is functionally like us but physically different—as is Commander Data of Star Trek's second generation. The papers on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett's theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness, as well as such empirical matters as "How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness," and (in an expanded version of a paper originally in Trends in Cognitive Sciences) an argument that there are distinct neural correlates for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black's argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider "mental paint" as well as the "Inverted Earth" thought experiment—a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them.

Consciousness, Function, and Representation, bringing together papers that have appeared primarily in journals and conference proceedings, can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness.

About the Author

Ned Block is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at New York University and was Chair of the Philosophy Program at MIT from 1990 to 1995. He is a coeditor of The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997).