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Winston Churchill's memorandum to the Cabinet justifying the Gallipoli campaign, heavily annotated by Sir Frederick Barton Maurice, Director of Military Operations, who recorded the remarks of John French in bitter opposition to Churchill. French argued Gallipoli was a strategic mistake that had gravely weakened the Western Front, which he regarded as the only theatre in which the war could be won. Churchill presented the memorandum on 18 June 1915. Marked "Secret" and as "the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government", it was printed at the Foreign Office for the use of the Cabinet, with a wide inner blank margin intended for annotation. Maurice has written "Sir J. French remarks" at the head and filled most of the blank space with a point-by-point rebuttal of the memorandum, amounting to around 850 words. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had spearheaded the Gallipoli campaign, which he believed would knock the Turks out of the war. The perceived failures of the operation led to his demotion to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on 25 May 1915. Despite being increasingly sidelined, he continued to argue his case in Cabinet. By November 1915 he was out of office. Churchill's report opens with the contention that the overall military position was precarious: German armies were ascendant on both fronts, and Russia lacked the munitions required to mount a counter-offensive. He rejects the prospect of a unilateral victory on the Western Front, arguing that vast resources had been squandered there with little result. John French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army on the Western Front, responded forcefully, defending the campaign in France. Some progress had been made, he insisted, but the diversion of men and ammunition to Gallipoli had led directly to failures. Where Churchill states, "The French offensive has up to the present failed completely", French counters, "this is not true. They have made ground and pushed back the Germans almost at every point along their immense line of front. Expansion is at the present moment taking place. The Ypres retreat was entirely due to the 'gas' surprise which cannot be repeated". The Gallipoli campaign, in his view, had siphoned off vital resources. French continues: "The whole paper seems to assume that the allies in the west have had all the force necessary for a successful offensive but have failed to carry it out. This is not the case. It is reasonably certain that if we had had in May the men guns and ammunition employed at the Dardanelles with which to back the French offensive at Arras, the German line would have been successfully broken". Churchill further asserts that France had borne the heaviest burden of the war and might be driven to make peace with Germany. French responds sharply: "This is the whole point and knocks the bottom out of this paper. Unless France is adequately supported in France there is no likelihood of a successful conclusion to this war". In French's view, Churchill's proposals amounted to "simply a gamble. Everything depends on the 'if' with the odds against it unless Germany sustains a severe reverse … no consideration is given to what may happen if this gamble doesn't come off". Churchill ends with a robust defence of the Gallipoli campaign. Taking Constantinople before the end of the summer would encourage Russia and France to fight on, allow Russian resources to move to the Eastern Front, protect Italy and the Balkans, and strengthen the Allies. French closes with an equally emphatic rebuttal: "There is every doubt and grave doubt. Has our success against intrenchments in the Gallipoli peninsula been greater than in Flanders? And are not German soldiers more difficult to drive back than Turks. If it is said that sufficient force has not yet been applied against the Gallipoli intrenchments, the same is true in Flanders. Success in Gallipoli is the success of a detachment which may produce unforeseen complications. In the case of Flander.
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