Understand how to choose metrics that align incentives in information systems projects.
This work presents a principled model showing how contract design and metric precision shape both builder and client outcomes in large software efforts. It helps explain why budgets and schedules dominate practice, and how new metrics could improve maintenance and business value.
The book explains a principal-agent framework applied to IS development. It defines how signals from imperfect metrics guide compensation and effort, and it discusses real-world examples from banks and consulting firms. You’ll see how precision and sensitivity influence which metrics are favored over time, and what this means for contract design and project success.
- How performance metrics relate to incentives and contractor behavior
- Why traditional metrics like cost and schedule persist in practice
- How maintainability and complexity metrics can be integrated into contracts
- Potential extensions to apply the model to different development environments
Ideal for readers seeking a clear, theory-grounded view of how metric choice affects IS project outcomes and contract evolution.