Understand how to choose metrics that align incentives in information systems projects.
This work presents a principled model showing how contract design and metric precision shape both builder and client outcomes in large software efforts. It helps explain why budgets and schedules dominate practice, and how new metrics could improve maintenance and business value.
The book explains a principal-agent framework applied to IS development. It defines how signals from imperfect metrics guide compensation and effort, and it discusses real-world examples from banks and consulting firms. You’ll see how precision and sensitivity influence which metrics are favored over time, and what this means for contract design and project success.
Ideal for readers seeking a clear, theory-grounded view of how metric choice affects IS project outcomes and contract evolution.
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HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LX-9780331574432
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Gebunden. Condition: New. KlappentextrnrnExcerpt from Performance Evaluation Metrics for Information Systems Development: A Principal-Agent ModelIn order to provide incentives for the agent to exert greater effort to produce higher levels of the outcomes of inter. Seller Inventory # 2144489607
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