The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions

Scheffler, Samuel

ISBN 10: 0198235100 / ISBN 13: 9780198235101

Published by Clarendon Press, 1994

About this Item

Priced As-Is! Photos available upon request! Book has light bumping to edges of spine and corners and mild underlining and annotating to various pages throughout; dust jacket has light rubbing to edges of cover and spine, light sunfading to spine and edges of cover near hinge, and mild rubbing to cover. otherwise book is in good condition with a bright cover, a solid binding, and now mylar laminated. Would be in very good condition if there was no underlining and annotating.

Seller Inventory # 1032085

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions
• Publisher: Clarendon Press
• Publication Date: 1994
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0198235100
• ISBN 13: 9780198235101
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: 2nd Edition
• Condition: Good +
• Dust Jacket Condition: Very Good
• Seller catalogs:
  • Philosophy

About this title

Synopsis

In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Samuel Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.

About the Author

Samuel Scheffler, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley.