Dirk Bergemann (32 results)

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Hardcover. Condition: As New. Signed on title page by Dirk Bergemann. Bound in fine blue leatherette, with gilt lettering and ruling. Hardcover. Good binding and cover. Clean, unmarked pages. William Polk Carey Prize in Economics winner, 1994. Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass & Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Computer Science at Yale University. He received his Vordiplom in Economics at J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt in 1989, and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and 1993 respectively. His research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation. Bergemann is foreign editor for the Review of Economic Studies, and associate editor of several publications, including American Economic Journal, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior and the Journal of Economic Theory. Bergemann has made important contributions to the theory of mechanism design. In his work with Steven Morris on robust mechanism design, they relaxed common knowledge assumptions which were prevalent in the early mechanism design literature. By formulating the mechanism design problem more precisely, they showed that simple mechanisms arise endogenously. This provided a theoretical justification for the relatively simple auction designs employed in practice, when compared to the complexity of optimal auctions suggested by the early literature. Bergemann has also pioneered work with consumer behavior around dynamic pricing structures. Signed.…

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HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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Hardback. Condition: New. New. Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 456 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.25 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 612 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.50 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condition: New. New. Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…

Gebunden. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation. This title brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.Inh.…

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 612 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.50 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextrnrnThis volume brings together the collected contributions of Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Vaelimaeki, on the theme of learning, experimentation and intertemporal incentives, spanning over two decades of thought (1996 to 2019).nThe collect. …

Buch. Condition: Neu. ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN | Bergemann Dirk | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2012 | World Scientific | EAN 9789814374583 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…