Hadley Tim (28 results)

Hardcover. Condition: Fine. Dust Jacket Condition: Fine. First Edition. Like New or Fine condition with a nice, crisp dust jacket. The book is almost Brand New. There is an organization donation sticker on the front flyleaf "A gift from Nevada ranchers" which I believe I can safely remove upon request. The covers are in great shape. The binding is tight. The interior pages are unmarked. Only a hint of shelf wear to jacket. The book will be carefully packaged for shipment for protection from the elements. USPS electronic tracking number issued free of charge.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. 160 pages. 7.75x5.00x7.75 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Stapled Wraps in Dust Jacket. 8vo, 59 pp. Head and heel of spine and corners bumped, small tear and faint stain at head of spine, small tear and a few spots to jacket. Very Good in Very Good Dust Jacket.

Paperback. Condition: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Condition: New. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarck's chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the French-six weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian army's severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germany's political leadership had known of the Austrian army's weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarck's diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austria's weakness that spurred Bismarck's energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austria's weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attachés, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable.

Condition: New. In.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. reprint edition. 249 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Condition: Gut. 264 S. kleine Gebrauchsspuren. Q80 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 800 Gebundene Ausgabe, Maße: 15.8 cm x 2.24 cm x 23.8 cm.

Softcover/Paperback. Condition: Wie neu. 248 Seiten neuwertig Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 702.

Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 264 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German military and political leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attachés, the a.

Paperback. Condition: New. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarck's chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the French-six weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian army's severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germany's political leadership had known of the Austrian army's weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarck's diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austria's weakness that spurred Bismarck's energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austria's weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attachés, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable.

Condition: New. In.

hardcover. Condition: As New. No markings. Pictorial boards. Always securely packed. Professional booksellers since 1994. Satisfaction guaranteed.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 249 pages. 9.25x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarcks chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the Frenchsix weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian armys severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germanys political leadership had known of the Austrian armys weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarcks diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austrias weakness that spurred Bismarcks energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austrias weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attaches, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable. This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germanys ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attaches, the author forces a reevaluation of the German position leading up to World War I. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarcks chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the Frenchsix weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian armys severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germanys political leadership had known of the Austrian armys weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarcks diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austrias weakness that spurred Bismarcks energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austrias weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attaches, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable. This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germanys ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attaches, the author forces a reevaluation of the German position leading up to World War I. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany s ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attaches, the auth.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attachés, the author forces a reevaluation of the German position leading up to World War I.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarcks chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the Frenchsix weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian armys severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germanys political leadership had known of the Austrian armys weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarcks diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austrias weakness that spurred Bismarcks energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austrias weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attaches, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable. This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German military and political leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attaches, the a. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarcks chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the Frenchsix weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian armys severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germanys political leadership had known of the Austrian armys weaknesses for decades before the war.The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarcks diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austrias weakness that spurred Bismarcks energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austrias weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attaches, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable. This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German military and political leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attaches, the a. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextThis book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarck s chancellorship. In 1914, Germany s opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a .

Buch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book challenges the commonly accepted claims of German memoirists that the significant weaknesses of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, were unknown to German military and political leaders before the war. Through an analysis of evidence from German military attachés, the author forces a reevaluation of the German position leading up to World War I.