Ivan Atuyambe (62 results)

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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Public Service Anti-Corruption and Performance Reform | Non-Monetary Incentives as an Effective Social Control Mechanism | Ivan Atuyambe | Taschenbuch | 64 S. | Englisch | 2015 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783659772566 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: OmniScriptum GmbH & Co. KG, Bahnhofstr. 28, 66111 Saarbrücken, info[at]akademikerverlag[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. …

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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Over the past two decades, corruption and anti-corruption have dominated talk on public sector reform. Governments around the world have enacted laws, set up special anti-corruption agencies; and increased salaries for public servants.Yet, corruption levels continue to persistently soar. The study puts forward two possible schools of thought that could offer a partial explanation to this paradox. One, reform focused on rules and punishments (legal approach) are expensive to pursue in contexts of societal acceptance of corruption - in which even those supposed to enforce the law cannot stand the test of integrity. More over, strict control and threats of punishment are not only expensive, but further damage creativity and innovation and promotes inertness among civil servants - sticking to the rules and procedures at the expense of flexibility and productivity. Two, traditionally, alternative anti-corruption efforts have concentrated on financial benefit incentives to deter corrupt behaviour, ignoring the potential of social (non-financial) incentives - non-monetary rewards such as integrity awards - public recognition of exemplary leadership and performance. 64 pp. Englisch.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Durante las últimas dos décadas, la corrupción y la lucha contra la corrupción han dominado el debate sobre la reforma del sector público. Los gobiernos de todo el mundo han promulgado leyes, creado organismos especiales de lucha contra la corrupción y aumentado los salarios de los funcionarios públicos. Sin embargo, los niveles de corrupción siguen aumentando de forma persistente. El estudio propone dos posibles corrientes de pensamiento que podrían ofrecer una explicación parcial a esta paradoja. En primer lugar, las reformas centradas en las normas y las sanciones (enfoque jurídico) son costosas de aplicar en contextos en los que la sociedad acepta la corrupción, en los que incluso quienes se supone que deben hacer cumplir la ley no superan la prueba de la integridad. Además, el control estricto y las amenazas de castigo no solo son costosos, sino que también dañan aún más la creatividad y la innovación y fomentan la inercia entre los funcionarios públicos, que se ciñen a las normas y procedimientos a expensas de la flexibilidad y la productividad. En segundo lugar, tradicionalmente, los esfuerzos alternativos contra la corrupción se han centrado en incentivos económicos para disuadir el comportamiento corrupto, ignorando el potencial de los incentivos sociales (no económicos), como las recompensas no monetarias, los premios a la integridad y el reconocimiento público del liderazgo y el rendimiento ejemplares. 64 pp. Spanisch.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Over the past two decades, corruption and anti-corruption have dominated talk on public sector reform. Governments around the world have enacted laws, set up special anti-corruption agencies; and increased salaries for public servants.Yet, corruption levels continue to persistently soar. The study puts forward two possible schools of thought that could offer a partial explanation to this paradox. One, reform focused on rules and punishments (legal approach) are expensive to pursue in contexts of societal acceptance of corruption - in which even those supposed to enforce the law cannot stand the test of integrity. More over, strict control and threats of punishment are not only expensive, but further damage creativity and innovation and promotes inertness among civil servants - sticking to the rules and procedures at the expense of flexibility and productivity. Two, traditionally, alternative anti-corruption efforts have concentrated on financial benefit incentives to deter corrupt behaviour, ignoring the potential of social (non-financial) incentives - non-monetary rewards such as integrity awards - public recognition of exemplary leadership and performance.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la corruption et la lutte contre la corruption ont dominé les débats sur la réforme du secteur public. Les gouvernements du monde entier ont promulgué des lois, créé des agences spéciales de lutte contre la corruption et augmenté les salaires des fonctionnaires. Pourtant, les niveaux de corruption continuent de grimper en flèche. L'étude propose deux écoles de pensée possibles qui pourraient expliquer en partie ce paradoxe. Premièrement, les réformes axées sur les règles et les sanctions (approche juridique) sont coûteuses à mettre en uvre dans un contexte où la corruption est acceptée par la société, où même ceux qui sont censés faire respecter la loi ne peuvent résister à la tentation de la corruption. De plus, un contrôle strict et la menace de sanctions sont non seulement coûteux, mais nuisent également à la créativité et à l'innovation et favorisent l'inertie parmi les fonctionnaires, qui s'en tiennent aux règles et aux procédures au détriment de la flexibilité et de la productivité. Deuxièmement, traditionnellement, les efforts alternatifs de lutte contre la corruption se sont concentrés sur les incitations financières pour dissuader les comportements corrompus, ignorant le potentiel des incitations sociales (non financières) - récompenses non monétaires telles que les prix d'intégrité - et la reconnaissance publique d'un leadership et de performances exemplaires. 64 pp. Französisch. …