Jikamura Wasuke Editor (1 results)

Ten parts in 3 volumes. First edition, the text in English for global distribution. Illustrated throughout with a vast number, indeed many hundreds of chromo-lithographs, coloured maps, charts, finely coloured plates, full-page photographs, colotypes and textual illustrations, mostly full-page and some double-page, with extraordinarily fine colour printing throughout including highlighting in silver and gold. Thick, Royal 8vo, publisher's bindings of three quarter morocco over cloth covered boards, the spine fully decorated with gilt roll tooling dividing the compartments, lettering in gilt, central ornamental devices gilt. vi, 424; ii, 425-848; ii, 849-1418 pp. A very good set indeed, the bindings strong, the text in pleasing condition with only occasional notes of wear, the many coloured plates very well preserved, some tissue guards with old evidence of damp not affecting the plates or text and probably from damp prior to binding, a pleasing set in well preserved condition. FIRST EDITION, BOUND FROM THE ORIGINAL PARTS, REPLETE WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MANY VERY FINELY COLOURED AND HIGHLIGHTED IN SILVER AND GOLD. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which began with the Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur, had repercussions throughout the world. Germany had helped to nudge both powers towards the war and had also managed to alienate both belligerents. She had used tremendous diplomatic pressure against the Japanese to force them to relinquish Port Arthur to the Chinese, who then leased it to the Russians. Simultaneously the newly emerged nation of Japan was training its army officers in Germany. German involvement in the conflict led to war scares with both France and Great Britain, causing Germany to quickly arrange an unwanted international conference at which they found themselves distrusted and isolated. The war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth, arranged by U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt. The Russo-Japanese War won for the U.S. a place at the table of superpowers and a new respect in world diplomacy, but for Germany it earned nothing but suspicion. In August 1905 the future chief of the general staff, Helmuth von Moltke, noted in his diary that "all the other nations are pretty well united in reviling Germany. They all assert that we are disturbing the peace."' Even Baron Friedrich von Holstein, the chief architect of foreign policy from 1890 to 1906, admitted the bankruptcy of German diplomacy. "In short," he wrote to a friend, "in the present atmosphere, it seems to me that the correct and dignified thing to do would be to act like Russia after the Crimean War and calmly to withdraw into ourselves.".