Lefebvre Perrin (24 results)

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Paperback. Condition: Brand New. 75 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.18 inches. In Stock.

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Condition: New. 2023. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

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Couverture souple. Condition: Bon. Edition originale. In-8° broché, paginé de 321 à 480 - Articles originaux : La Banque des règlements internationaux. - L'évolution économique de la Suède au XIX° siècle (Premier article). - Les problèmes de l'or. Aujourd'hui. - Les archives privées et l'histoire : Un exemple et une leçon. Les archives d'une banque contemporaine. - Économistes, historiens, hommes d'actions : Jean Bodin. - Congrès et centres d'études : Une conférence internationale des sciences économiques appliquées.

Couverture souple. Condition: Bon. Edition originale. In-8° broché, paginé de 113 à 224 - Articles originaux : Aux origines du Mont-de-Piété parisien : bienfaisance et crédit (1777-1789). - Un grand chapitre de l'histoire du fer : le monopole suédois (Première partie). - En période de révolution économique : la monnaie en Castille (1501-1650) (Première partie). - La crise bancaire en Allemagne. - La crise bancaire en Europe centrale. - Archives et bibliothèques : Les archives de l'État en Belgique de 1919 à 1930. - Un dépôt d'archives.

Couverture souple. Condition: Bon. Edition originale. In-8° broché, 112 pages - Articles originaux : Le problème de l'or au moyen âge. - Aux États-Unis : la crise bancaire et la grande crise. - Manuels ou synthèses ? - Archives et bibliothèques. - Instruments de recherches, périodiques, publications courantes. - L'histoire et le commerce dans l'ancienne Pologne. - Sur la vie économique du Tirol méridional. - Le Rhin. - Du rôle des avant-ports entrepôts, français et étrangers, dans l'ancien commerce.

Couverture souple. Condition: Neuf. Edition originale. Grand in-8° broché On entre souvent dans une institution pour y trouver refuge, par peur d'une réalité vécue comme trop effractante, par peur d'une intériorité menaçante, etc. Les institutions de soin qui accueillent les personnes en détresse psychique ont ainsi souvent pour fonction première d'apaiser la peur. Or il n'est pas si facile pour les soignants de percevoir les angoisses inconscientes et archaïques que la peur recèle, angoisses que la parole ne parvient pas toujours à traduire et qui se dissimulent souvent derrière toutes sortes de manifestations par le comportement. En essayant d'être réceptif à son contre-transfert, à ses propres peurs et angoisses, ceux qui ont affaire au soin psychique en institution peuvent tenter de contenir et éventuellement transformer les peurs infantiles qui se cachent derrière les troubles psychiques de l'adulte. Les peurs issues de la nuit des temps prennent toutes les formes des histoires que l'on raconte aux enfants : celles allant du monstre informe dans l'autisme ou la démence, au grand méchant loup des pulsions débridées, en passant par les fantômes de l'abandon et de la mort, ou par le démoniaque violent et haineux. Elles engagent différentes expressions symptomatiques, différents registres, qui recèlent un potentiel de vie psychique à condition d'être racontés et interrogés plutôt que refoulés ou déniés.

Couverture souple. Condition: Bon. Edition originale. In-8° broché, 112 pages - Articles originaux : L'histoire économique et la vie : leçon d'une exposition. - Chicago, expérience ethnique. - Économistes, historiens, hommes d'action : Walther Rathenau et son système. - Congrès et centres d'études : Les Centres d'études d'histoire économique en Pologne. - Nouvelles scientifiques. - Noms de personne et histoire sociale. - Un marché de valeurs au XIII° siècle : la "Compere salis" de Gênes. + A propos d'un essai d'histoire régionale. - Où en est le capitalisme américain.

Couverture souple. Condition: Bon. Edition originale. In-8° broché, paginé de 225 à 336 - Articles originaux : Un grand commerce d'exportation au moyen âge : les vins de France. - L'organisation bancaire de la Suisse. - Histoire urbaine : directions de recherches et résultats. - De l'histoire-tableau : essais de critique constructive. - Congrès et centres d'études : En Pologne : un maître, une école. - Statistiques : Les statistiques agricoles officielles françaises : étude critique.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus are linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size. This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyzes linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. 75 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.18 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 140.

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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus are linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size. This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyzes linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus are linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size. This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyzes linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Inhaltsverzeichnis1. Introduction 2. Literature review 3. The model 4. Unrestricted contracting 5. Non-negative payments: preliminaries 6. Non-negative payments and delegated agency: congruent interests 7. Non-negative payments and.