Tolla Abebe (8 results)

Condition: New. pp. 52.

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. The Economics of Contracting Public Project | Some Challenges of Contracting Public Project | Abebe Tolla | Taschenbuch | 52 S. | Englisch | 2013 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783659490279 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book gives insights to answer the problem that faces public organization in delegating their mega projects to their agents in three level of hierarchical model. Taking three players: the politician, the bureaucrat and the contractor, I developed a three level hierarchical adverse selection model. In the model the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician and the contractor in turn is also an agent to the bureaucrat. Each player in the game has their own strategies that enable them to determine their payoffs. Basically the players apply the technique of backward induction either to deal with the project work or not. The same process also helps us to determine the outcome (Nash equilibrium) of the game. In this game players have a complete information of their types but have a blurt information about the other players type. In the principal agent model the prevalent problem is the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and his/her agent. The agent knows his/her type for sure but the principal knows the true types of his/her agent with certain probabilities. This is the adverse selection problem that should be mitigated somehow. 52 pp. Englisch.…

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 52 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 52.

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book gives insights to answer the problem that faces public organization in delegating their mega projects to their agents in three level of hierarchical model. Taking three players: the politician, the bureaucrat and the contractor, I developed a three level hierarchical adverse selection model. In the model the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician and the contractor in turn is also an agent to the bureaucrat. Each player in the game has their own strategies that enable them to determine their payoffs. Basically the players apply the technique of backward induction either to deal with the project work or not. The same process also helps us to determine the outcome (Nash equilibrium) of the game. In this game players have a complete information of their types but have a blurt information about the other players type. In the principal agent model the prevalent problem is the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and his/her agent. The agent knows his/her type for sure but the principal knows the true types of his/her agent with certain probabilities. This is the adverse selection problem that should be mitigated somehow.…

Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Tolla AbebeAn Economist and Information system analyst by profession, Abebe Simie, works with business owners and non profit organization. His dual profession helps him to understand problems from different angles and sharpen him to .…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book gives insights to answer the problem that faces public organization in delegating their mega projects to their agents in three level of hierarchical model. Taking three players: the politician, the bureaucrat and the contractor, I developed a three level hierarchical adverse selection model. In the model the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician and the contractor in turn is also an agent to the bureaucrat. Each player in the game has their own strategies that enable them to determine their payoffs. Basically the players apply the technique of backward induction either to deal with the project work or not. The same process also helps us to determine the outcome (Nash equilibrium) of the game. In this game players have a complete information of their types but have a blurt information about the other players type. In the principal agent model the prevalent problem is the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and his/her agent. The agent knows his/her type for sure but the principal knows the true types of his/her agent with certain probabilities. This is the adverse selection problem that should be mitigated somehow.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 52 pp. Englisch. …