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Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) - Softcover

Patrick Bolton

 
9781332248551: Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint)

Synopsis

Understand how competition and financing shape corporate risk and incentives.

This rigorous analysis examines how agency problems in financial contracting can invite predation in competitive markets. It builds a clear framework showing how the design of contracts between firms and investors influences both funding decisions and managers’ incentives, and it explains when predation helps or hurts in a multi-period setting. The work contrasts different ways predation can unfold and how observability of contracts changes strategic choices for both investors and rivals.

  • How refinancing and internal funds affect a firm’s incentives and exit decisions over time
  • How predatory actions by rivals can emerge and how contracts can deter or enable them
  • Solutions that balance deterring predation with maintaining strong managerial incentives
  • What contract observability means for real-world financing and corporate governance

Ideal for readers interested in finance, corporate strategy, and economic theory, exploring how capital structure and market competition interact in practice.

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About the Author

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of "The Journal of the European Economic Association".

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