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One for You, Three for Me (Classic Reprint): Or the Design of Optimal Production Sharing Rules for a Petroleum Exploration Venture - Softcover
Synopsis
This book examines the design and analysis of production sharing rules in the context of petroleum exploration ventures. Drawing from economics and finance principles, the author presents an in-depth analysis of a real-world oil and gas exploration agreement. The book employs a Principal-Agent model to evaluate the incentives embedded in the actual contract and proposes an optimal sharing rule that maximizes the net financial return to the resource owner. The author highlights the potential benefits of using agency models not just for general insights but for fine-tuning the design and parameters of financial contracts in specific cases. Through a detailed case study, the book demonstrates the practical application of agency theory in optimizing resource extraction agreements, offering valuable insights for practitioners and scholars in the fields of finance, natural resource management, and contract design.
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One for You, Three for Me (Classic Reprint)
Print on DemandSeller: Forgotten Books, London, United Kingdom
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Paperback. Condition: New. Print on Demand. This book examines the design and analysis of production sharing rules in the context of petroleum exploration ventures. Drawing from economics and finance principles, the author presents an in-depth analysis of a real-world oil and gas exploration agreement. The book employs a Principal-Agent model to evaluate the incentives embedded in the actual contract and proposes an optimal sharing rule that maximizes the net financial return to the resource owner. The author highlights the potential benefits of using agency models not just for general insights but for fine-tuning the design and parameters of financial contracts in specific cases. Through a detailed case study, the book demonstrates the practical application of agency theory in optimizing resource extraction agreements, offering valuable insights for practitioners and scholars in the fields of finance, natural resource management, and contract design. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781334087943_0
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One for You, Three for Me Or the Design of Optimal Production Sharing Rules for a Petroleum Exploration Venture Classic Reprint
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
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PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781334087943
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One for You, Three for Me Or the Design of Optimal Production Sharing Rules for a Petroleum Exploration Venture Classic Reprint
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
Seller rating 5 out of 5 stars
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781334087943
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Quantity: 15 available