This book studies how firms' timing of private information acquisition affects market equilibrium in a duopoly. The book introduces a multi-period signaling model to explore this topic in the context of two main market uncertainty scenarios: uncertainty of industry-wide conditions and uncertainty about individual firms' costs. The author finds that the optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the nature of the uncertainty and the precision of the available information. In many cases studied, firms prefer to delay the acquisition of information when there is uncertainty about industry-wide conditions, but prefer to acquire information as soon as possible when there is uncertainty about individual firm costs. The study is significant because it provides new insights into how information asymmetry and signaling affect market outcomes, and offers testable predictions for empirical research.
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Seller: Forgotten Books, London, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: New. No Jacket. Print on Demand. How fast should firms share private information in competitive markets? This book explores a multi-period model where two firms decide when to observe and reveal private signals, and how those choices affect outputs, profits, and prices. It compares cases where a common value is uncertain with cases where each firm holds private value information, using a tractable linear information structure.In clear, step-by-step analysis, the author shows how timing decisions unfold across three stages, how signaling can move the equilibrium, and why full information sharing is often not stable. The discussion breaks down into two main setups-the common value case and the private value case-and examines how first- and second-period effects interact with signaling costs.What you'll experience- A structured look at three timing scenarios for information acquisition and their strategic outcomes- A close look at how signaling, information accuracy, and the value type (common vs private) shape output and profits- A comparative view of one-period versus multi-period information sharing and the resulting equilibria- Concrete propositions that illustrate when early information observation helps or hurts each firmIdeal for readers who study game theory, industrial organization, and economic strategy, and who want to understand how information flows influence competitive timing and profits. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Seller Inventory # 9781334344596_0
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781334344596
Seller: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom
PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Seller Inventory # LW-9781334344596
Quantity: 15 available