Operation Barbarossa (3 results)

Repro-Porträtfoto (in Uniform mit Ritterkreuz), rückseitig leicht verblasst eigenhändig signiert mit persönlicher Widmung, Empfehlung, Datum 20.9.86.

No Binding. Condition: Good. Soviet Response to Operation Barbarossa, July 1941. **Soviet Response to the Beginning of the Nazi Attack, July 1941** Radio Address by Mr. M.M. Litvinov, Member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Former People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. July 8, 1941 12.5x8", 4 leaves. Offset printed from typed original. No place or date of publication. Good copy, only. A little brittle, and also somewhat tattered along the top edges. Also there is a Library of Congress surplus/duplicate stamp on the rear wrapper. Loose leaves, formerly stapled. Mimeographed production. Provenance: U.S. Supreme Court, and then the Library of Congress. WorldCat/OCLC locates 0 copies. [++] It is hard to criticize the Soviets when they were at their post WWI weakest, but I needed to point out a few, well, inconsistencies in the following statement by Maxim Litvinov. The text is that of a radio address by the mega-connected and high profile Russian revolutionary and People's Commissar of the USSR, and it was delivered on July 8, 1941. At this point Litvinov (1876-1951)--who would in a few weeks become the Soviet Ambassador to the United States--was addressing the weeks-old attack and declaration of war made upon the U.S.S.R. by Nazi Germany. It was a terrible and nearly mortal blow to the state, and Hitler's vast overreach very nearly came to be. Still there were some bits in the address that were difficult to absorb. For example Litvinov states: Hitlerite Germany's treacherous attack on the peaceful Soviet Union in face of the Non-aggression Pact. The Soviets did indeed sign a hands-off/so-no-evil Non-Aggression Pact (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) with the Nazis in August 1939 and enjoyed the fruits of that special relationship, the two nations dividing conquered border states according to each other's "sphere of influence". So, this pact was "peaceful" only so far the U.S.S.R. is concerned, and not so peaceful for other nations. [++]Then this: The Soviet Government was almost first to realize the danger of Nazi aggressiveness. , which seems hard to acknowledge when they shared a non-aggression pact/treaty in the early stages of WWII. Then the veritable miracles of heroism of the Red Army is bearing the whole of Hitler's powerful war machine and compelling him to transfer more and more forces from West to East . I will not doubt heroism of fallen soldiers in a near lost cause effort, and it is true that the Germans would half- or mostly-exhaust themselves in the East, maybe more than that, probably, probably costing Hitler far more than he could ever have conceived. Stalin had already murdered his way through a large swath of the Soviet command structure, and was also unwilling to recognize that the Nazi attack was in fact the Real Thing. Stalin hesitated, and went incognito a little, and in general did not know what to do; he did come to his senses in short order, but a great amount of damage had already been done to Soviet defenses, and that would nearly cost him the country. But it didn't, and the U.S.S.R. rallied, and at the cost of millions of lives killed the Germany armies in the East, and really was responsible for contributing in large part to the defeat of Nazism. Thanks to this the English people are enjoying a certain respite after twelve months of incessant bombardment. , which was true to some degree. Each blow struck now is ten times as effective and entails infinitely less expenditure and sacrifice than if it is delivered when anyone [sic] of his adversaries becomes weaker . And so on.

Fascinating and extremely rare Soviet photo-reconnaissance piece from the notorious siege of Leningrad (September 1941 - January 1945); records in detail the defensive works on a 10 km sector of the German line around the invested city which tracks through the Tsarist palace complexes in the south, sites such as the White Tower and St Catherine's Cathedral visible in the tree line. Unsurprisingly we have been unable to trace another example, or similar; although clearly such visual intelligence would have been of vital importance, copies being generated commensurately with need. However, the supersession of the information contained, and general conditions on campaign must have ensured a high rate of attrition. The panorama very much has the feel of having been improvised in the field, but the information is conveyed with precision and clarity, and evidently follows some earlier, more formally produced model. The capture of Leningrad was one of the key targets of Nazi Germany's operations against Russia. Not only was the city the base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and one of the major hubs of Russia's military-industrial complex, it also embodied considerable political status both as the former capital of Russian Imperial greatness, and as symbolic capital of Bolshevism and the Revolution. When the German High Command's expectation of a rapid collapse evaporated, both sides settled in for what was to become one the longest and most costly sieges in history, with Hitler's intended endgame apparently the complete destruction of the city and the "dispersal" of its population. During the siege Nazi headquarters was located in the Alexander Palace in Tsarskoye Selo, and the complex of buildings - "a magnificent symbol, a supreme gesture, of the Russian autocracy. a miniature world, as artificial and as fantastic as a precisely ordered mechanical toy" (Massie, p.117) - stripped of their treasures, and systematically slighted, leaving little intact on their withdrawal. It was, of course, from the Catherine Palace that the fabled Amber Room was removed, crated and shipped to Königsberg, now Kaliningrad, where it was installed in the castle museum, and from whence it disappeared before the Allies could secure it. Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandria, 1967. Landscape quarto (210 x 330 mm), 22 sheets of light olive card, jointed leporello-style with moderate blue cloth, printed labels, neatly completed in ink to the front cover, 51 original silver gelatine prints, numbered in the negative (c. 100 x 150 mm) mounted as a continuous panorama c. 7,260 mm, inked identifications of villages, significant landmarks, and defensive structures, machine gun dug outs, bunkers, reconnaissance posts. Relevant section of a detailed map mounted inside the front cover, neatly keyed in manuscript to the images. Externally rubbed and soiled, front panel with accession wet stamp and inked details, some marks internally, latter half hole-punched where previously ?laced together, a bit shaken, images clean and with good contrast, remains very good.